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II. ARGUMENT IN REPLY
A. Response to State's Statement of Facts

In its Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings, the State writes that Mr. Curry made
a gesture with his hand and Mr. Escudero saw a "black piece of something" prior to Mr.
Escudero grabbing the large metal pipe. Respondent's Brief p. 2, first full paragraph. However,
Mr. Escudero's testimony was that he grabbed the pipe and then Mr. Curry made the gesture and
Mr. Escudero saw "a black piece of something." Tr. p. 42, In. 11 - p. 43, In. 6.
Mr. Escudero testified:
... after the coffee table was kicked over, I was kind of worried that the situation
was escalating. I have children there. So I stood up, and I grabbed a pole because
I didn't want anything else to happen. And, when I grabbed the pole, Mr. Curry
had his hand in this pocket the whole time since I was there. He didn't brandish a
weapon to me. He just made a gesture. And I saw a black piece of something,
which at the time I thought it was a pistol. Brandished that. Didn't show me the
whole weapon or anything if there was even one.

" ,
Yeah. When he came in he was yelling all kinds of things to us, threw the clothes.
And then when I got that pole it was right by my couch. I picked up the pole. He
kind of lunged up, just pulled his hand out and said: "Do you want to go?" And
that's why I took it as a threat of a pistol is because if you have a hand in your
pocket, just from what I've been trained and stuff, I observe people's hands. And
there was a gesture of, you know, of what could you have in your pocket that
would stop a pole?
Tr. p. 42, In. 19-p.43,ln. 13.
In fact, the prosecutor clarified the order of the events in the following exchange with Mr.
Escudero:
Q: You made a reference to his hand had been in the pocket the whole time of this
encounter?

A: Yes. When he walked in. That's one of the things they teach you to do in the
military is to watch peoples' hands. Observe them. When he walked in, I could
see that his hand was in his pocket. And I didn't see his hand leave his pocket at
all the whole time. He threw the bag of clothes with his other hand and then
proceeded to yell and kick the table. And then after he had made that gesture, we
started to go inside the house, and he had left.
Q: And when he made the gesture and said: "Do you want to go?" was that
immediately after you had pulled up the pole?
A: Well, I had just stood up and picked it up, yeah. At that point when the table
got kicked at me and my fiancee I wasn't really worried about anything else at that
point but us and the children.
Tr. p. 44, In. 3-19. See also Supp. Tr. p. 6, In. 19 - p. 7, In. 25, where, in the State's Opening
Statement, it is said the evidence will show that Mr. Escudero grabbed the pipe before Mr. Curry
made the hand gesture which led Mr. Escudero to believe that he had a gun and was threatening
him. Further see, Supp. Tr. p. 47, In. 10 - p. 48, In. 17, p. 50, In. 1-4, p. 53, In. 15-20, where in
Closing Argument the State repeatedly argues the hand gesture was not made until after Mr.
Escudero grabbed the pipe.
Contrary to the State's statement of facts and later argument in its brief on appeal, Mr.
Escudero grabbed the pole before, not after, Mr. Curry made a hand gesture and Mr. Escudero
thought he saw some black piece of something.
The State also asserts in its statement of facts that Mr. Curry's brother heard Mr. Curry
say the word "gun" on the telephone on the same evening he went into Mr. Escudero's garage.
Respondent's Briefp. 2. However, Mr. Curry went into the garage on February 20,2010. Tr. p.
36, In. 20 - p. 37, In. 4; p. 60, In. 19-23. Mr. Curry's brother overheard him say the word "gun"
on the telephone two days later on February 22,2010. Tr. p. 135, In. 20 - p. 137, In. 6. There was
no testimony that anyone heard Mr. Curry using the word "gun" on February 20,2010.
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B. The Evidence Was Not Sufficient to Prove the Elements of the Offenses
Beyond a Reasonable Doubt

To sustain the burglary charge, the State was required to prove that Mr. Curry entered the
garage with the intent to commit witness intimidation and/or aggravated assault.

I.e. § 18-1401,

RIll.
In its brief on appeal, the State argues that it presented substantial evidence upon which
the jury could conclude that Mr. Curry "entered the garage on the date in question with the intent
to find Ms. Ferra and confront her about informing the police of her suspicions that he had taken
and wrecked her car." Respondent's Briefp. 9.
However, it should be first noted that Mr. Curry entered the garage through the open large
door. See Tr. p. 41, In. 22 - p. 42, In. 6. (The outside entrance to the garage is only through the
large door. The other door in the garage leads into the house. Mr. Curry entered directly into the
garage, not through the house. T r. p. 42, In. 1-17.)
Ms. Ferra was obviously not in the garage. This would have been readily apparent to
anyone walking up the driveway and into the garage. Therefore, the State did not present
substantial evidence that Mr. Curry entered the garage with the intent to even see Ms. Ferra.
Rather, he entered the garage knowing she was not there.
It should also be noted that the State does not argue that it provided substantial proof of
an intent to commit witness intimidation. Rather, it argues that it provided substantial evidence
that Mr. Curry had the "intent to find Ms. Ferra and confront her about informing the police of
her suspicions that he had taken and wrecked the car." Respondent's Brief p. 9.
Mr. Curry disputes that the State presented any evidence of an intent on his part to find
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and confront Ms. Ferra. However, even if that was his intent - to find and confront herconfrontation is not witness intimidation.
As defined by I.e. § 18-2604(3), witness intimidation requires a belief by the defendant
that the victim may be called as a witness in any criminal proceeding. The State presented
absolutely no proof that Mr. Curry believed that Ms. Ferra would ever be a witness in any
criminal proceeding regarding the car. In fact, there were no charges ever filed against him with
regard to the car.
Further, I.C. § 18-2604(3) defines the proscribed behavior as wilfully intimidates,
influences, impedes, deters, threatens, harasses, obstructs, or prevents a witness, potential witness
or person believed to be a potential witness from testifying freely, fully and truthfully in any
criminal proceeding by means of direct or indirect force or by any threats to person or property.
Confrontation is neither force nor threat. Mr. Curry maintains that the State did not even present
evidence of an intent to confront Ms. Ferra. But, even if the evidence could possibly be
construed to indicate an intent to confront Ms. Ferra, there was no evidence whatsoever of any
intent to use direct or indirect force or threats to person or property against Ms. Ferra to stop her
from testifying in a criminal proceeding that did not even exist.
The State did not present substantial proof that Mr. Curry entered the garage with the
intent to commit witness intimidation against Ms. Ferra.
Likewise, the State did not present substantial proof that Mr. Curry entered the garage
with the intent to commit aggravated assault. The State emphasizes that its substantial proof is
the evidence it presented that Mr. Escudero "believed" that Mr. Curry had a gun and that
combined with the earlier phone call, the fact that Mr. Curry's brother heard him say the word
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"gun" on the night of the garage entry and the subsequent discovery of a gun in the house, that
this amounted to substantial proof of entry into the garage with intent to commit aggravated
assault. Respondent's Brief at pages 9-11.
However, it should first be noted that Mr. Curry's brother did not hear him use the word
"gun" until two days later. It is impossible to conclude that the single utterance of the word
"gun" two days after the event, goes to prove possession of a gun at the garage. And, the
discovery of the gun some three days after the garage incident in the place where Mr. Curry's
mother had hidden it years ago in a seemingly undisturbed state is also impossible to tie to
possession of a gun at the garage. If anything, it goes to prove the opposite.
And, the earlier phone call received by Mr. Escudero does not go to show the presence of
a gun. If the call referenced a gun, then the case would be different. But, the call included no
statement about a gun. Even if the call is taken in the worst possible light for Mr. Curry as a
threat of some sort, it is not a threat of an impending assault with a gun.
While the State says its proof was something more than a bulge in the pocket with a
threatening gesture, in fact, that is all the proof of the presence of a gun that the State had.
Moreover, of course, burglary requires an intent to commit a crime at the time of the
entry. Even if the State did not have proof problems with the very existence of a gun, it still had
insurmountable proof problems in that it had no proof that even if armed, Mr. Curry's intent was
to commit an aggravated assault when he entered the garage. Consider the sequence of events in
the garage. Mr. Curry yelled and screamed and kicked a table. Mr. Escudero grabbed a large
metal pipe. It was only then, when faced with a metal pipe, that Mr. Escudero believes that Mr.
Curry made a gesture and he saw a black piece of something. Had Mr. Curry's intent been
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aggravated assault, any gesture with any gun would have come before, not after, he was
threatened with a pipe. And, of course, Mr. Curry would have actually displayed a weapon rather
than move his hand from his pocket and then tum around and walk away.
There was not proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the elements of burglary.
Likewise, there was not proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the elements of aggravated
assault, specifically that Mr. Curry committed an assault with a deadly weapon.
As the State admits, at best its proof was that Mr. Escudero believed there was a gun
based upon a hand gesture and a glimpse of a piece of a black something. Respondent's Brief p.
10. As set out in Lawless v. Commonwealth, 323 S.W.3d 676,679 (Ky. 2010); Swain v.
Commonwealth, 887 S.W.2d 346 (Ky. 1994); Williams v. Commonwealth, 721 S.W.2d 710 (Ky.
1987); and People v. Banks, 563 N. W.2d 200, 201 (1997), it is not sufficient to prove just that
the alleged victim thought that the defendant was armed. See also, United States v. Huckins, 95
F.3d 276,279-80 (9 th Cir. 1990), holding that the statement of a bank teller that she believed
Huckins had a gun because he kept his hands in his pockets at all times during a robbery does not
prove, even by a preponderance of the evidence, that Huckins was armed. The State was
required to prove that Mr. Curry committed an assault with a deadly weapon. The State offered
only Mr. Escudero's belief that Mr. Curry was armed - a belief that Mr. Escudero himself
undercut by testifYing that Mr. Curry could have had anything in his pocket including a water
pistol. Tr. p. 51, In. 21-23. This was not substantial proof of all the elements of aggravated
assault. There must be some proof of a gun. And, in this case there simply was not that proof.
Due process requires that no person be convicted except upon proof beyond a reasonable
doubt of every element of the offense. United States Const. Amend. 5 and 14, Idaho Const.
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Article 1, Sec. 13. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1071 (1970); Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315-6, 99 S.Ct. 2781,2787 (1979). In this case, there was not proof

beyond a reasonable doubt of either burglary or aggravated assault and therefore those
convictions as well as the convictions resting upon their validity must be vacated and judgments
of acquittal entered.

C. Refusal of a Self-Defense Instruction Was Reversible Error
Mr. Curry set out in the Opening Brief that the refusal to give a self-defense instruction
was reversible error. In particular, there was support in the evidence for a self-defense
instruction because the evidence was that Mr. Curry only made the gesture that Mr. Escudero
assumed was the display of a weapon after Mr. Escudero had grabbed a metal pipe. Mr. Curry's
gesture was in response to the threat posed by that pipe. Opening Brief at pages 17-21.
The State has first replied by arguing, contrary to its position at trial and contrary to the
evidence, that Mr. Curry made the hand gesture that would constitute the aggravated assault prior
to Mr. Escudero grabbing the pipe. The State writes, "A review of the record shows that the
district court properly rejected the requested self-defense instruction because there was no
evidence whatsoever that there was any threat from the victim at the time of the assault."
Respondent's Brief at page 13. However, the evidence is that the hand gesture, which was taken
as a threat of harm by a gun, was made only after Mr. Escudero grabbed the pipe.
The State further argues that the District Court was correct in imposing a requirement that
Mr. Curry show a subjective fear of Mr. Escudero through statements to the police or testimony
that he was afraid prior to this incident to be entitled to a self-defense instruction. However, the
State cites no authority for this position and instead inserts a quote from the trial judge wherein
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he stated that the facts would not allow the jury to infer that Mr. Curry was in fear. Respondent's
Brief at page 14. Of course, the judge's opinion by itself is not authority.
Moreover, the State's quote includes only a part of the judge's comments. The judge's
conclusion was:
So this court finds that there is no evidence before this jury of subjective fear, and
therefore, the jury cannot determine whether there was any reasonably objective
fear and will not be given any self-defense instructions.
Supp. Tr. p. 22, In. 12-16.
The Court had earlier noted that subjective fear could have been shown ifMr. Curry had
run away upon seeing Mr. Escudero grab the pipe, but the fact that he did not run away but rather
that he made the hand gesture showed he was not afraid. Supp. Tr. p. 21, In. 22 - p. 22, In. 11.1
The State is incorrect in two ways. First, it is incorrect in its assertions that Mr. Escudero
grabbed the pipe after the hand gesture and that there was no threat to Mr. Curry at the time the
hand gesture was made. Second, it is incorrect in arguing that a demonstration of a subjective
fear (for example, by running away) is required before a self-defense instruction may be given.
Indeed, if the State's argument is correct - that one must demonstrate a subjective fear
prior to being entitled to a self-defense instruction - the only way to get a self-defense instruction
would be to either waive the state and federal constitutional rights to remain silent and testify at
trial or to run away from the aggression of the "victim," which, of course, would completely
eliminate the right to self-defense as the only way to claim the right would be to abandon the

The Court was wrong that Mr. Curry needed to demonstrate a subjective fear to obtain a
self-defense instruction, and the Court's evaluation of the facts is also wrong - while Mr. Curry
did not "run" away, after Mr. Escudero grabbed the pipe, Mr. Curry did walk away. Ifleaving is
a sign of subjective fear, then Mr. Curry displayed subjective fear.
1
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right. It would also make IClI 1519 regarding no duty to retreat an absurdity. That instruction
states that "one may stand one's ground and defend" and that "a person may pursue the attacker"
until he has been secured from danger. And, lastly, the State's position conflicts with Idaho
Constitution, Article 1, Section 1, which makes defense of life and protection of property
inalienable rights.
As set out in Mr. Curry's Opening Brief, the District Court erred in failing to give a selfdefense instruction.
D. A New Trial Should Have Been Granted

Mr. Curry set out in his Opening Brief that the District Court erred in denying the new
trial motion insofar as the Court abused its discretion in not understanding the scope of its
discretion to determine whether the presumption that the jury could follow its limiting instruction
was overcome. Appellant's Opening Brief at page 21-24.
The State has responded by first arguing this theory was not presented to the trial court in
support of the motion for a new trial. Respondent's Brief at pages 15-16. However, this is
precisely the theory that trial counsel argued to the District Court. Tr. p. 243, In. 24 - p. 245, In.
7. And this is precisely the theory the District Court ruled upon. Tr. p. 252, In.12 - p. 256, In.
14. And, it was in ruling upon this theory that the Court stated, "And I have to make the
presumption the appellate courts have told we trial judges to make sure that jurors follow the
limiting instructions of the Court." Tr. p. 256, In. 11-13.

It was in making this presumption without recognizing that the presumption can be
overcome that the District Court abused its discretion. State v. White, 97 Idaho 708, 551 P.2d
1344 (1976); State v. Wrenn, 99 Idaho 506, 584 P.2d 1232 (1978); State v. Simonsen, 112 Idaho
9

451,732 P.2d 689 (1987).
The State's only response to this is a single statement that there is nothing in the record to
indicate the jury could not follow the Court's instructions. Respondent's Brief at page 16. But,
there is ample record that the jury could not follow the Court's instructions. There was so much
inadmissible evidence (evidence that Ms. Ferra told the police she was afraid ofMr. Curry) and
evidence that was subject to limitation (evidence that Ms. Ferra told the police she had
previously seen Mr. Curry with a gun) that it overwhelmed the rest of the trial and resulted in Mr.
Curry being convicted on proof that did not meet the constitutional standard of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt.
As set out in the Opening Brief and above, the District Court erred in not granting the
new trial motion.
III. CONCLUSION

Mr. Curry asks this Court to reverse his convictions and enter judgments of acquittal
because the evidence was not constitutionally sufficient. In the first alternative, he asks that the
convictions be reversed and the case remanded for a new trial because the denial of a self-defense
instruction was erroneous. In the second alternative, he asks that the order denying a new trial be
reversed.
Respectfully submitted

thiS~ay of February, 2012.
Deborah Whipple
Attorney for David Curry
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